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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003399

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PNAT](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: BADR CORPS SECGEN VIEWS ON MILITIA DEMOBILIZATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 02979
[1](#)B. BAGHDAD 03282

Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Margaret Scobey, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) SUMMARY: On September 5, Council of Representatives (CoR) member and Shiite Badr Corps Secretary General Hadi Al-Amiri met with Embassy and MNF-I officials to share views on how to deal with militias in Iraq. Amiri reiterated strong support for the implementation of CPA Order 91 but believes pre-regime and post-regime militias should be dealt with differently. He requested U.S. support in lobbying the GOI for retirement of additional Badr Corps members. Amiri cautioned that any plan to control or disband militias must also address other legally sanctioned armed groups, including ministry-controlled Facility Protection Service (FPS) forces, private security companies and personal security details (PSDs). END SUMMARY.

CPA ORDER 91

[1](#)2. (C) Hadi Al-Amiri said he considered militias a serious problem for Iraq and that the longer there was a delay in dealing with them, the bigger the problem will become. Repeating his position from a previous meeting with Embassy and MNF-I officials, Amiri said that militias should be dealt with according to CPA-91 as soon as possible (REF B).
[1](#)3. (C) Amiri asked for support for the integration of several thousand additional Badr Corps members into the ISF and to retire or provide stipends to widows and orphans of over 6,000 additional members. (COMMENT: The original agreement to integrate or retire Badr Corps members was reached by CPA in 2004 (REF A); MFN-I will address the issue in follow-up discussions. END COMMENT).

DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS

[1](#)4. (C) On Amiri said all armed groups could not be dealt with in the same way. He described four categories of armed groups which he believes must be dealt with separately from the CPA 91 process: Takfiri) ideologically motivated terrorist groups; Saddamist) former regime military, security and government officials actively fighting against the coalition and government; criminal enterprises; and sectarian extremists) groups organized along strictly sectarian lines that are actively targeting other groups.

[1](#)5. (C) Amiri held that the first two groups must be faced head on and eliminated. They would not negotiate nor be open to dialogue and this should not be attempted. Organized criminal gangs or Mafia-style organizations must be dealt with by law enforcement. Only sectarian groups, which included militias, could be negotiated with. The Iraqi government, and religious and tribal leaders should engage

these groups and attempt to convince them to stop their activities. Amiri stated that if sectarian groups could not be convinced to change their ways, they would have to be taken on and dealt with similar to the other three groups.

¶16. (C) Amiri also said that a clear distinction must be made between militias organized before the fall of the Saddam regime (pre-collapse) and afterwards (post-collapse). Groups formed pre-collapse must be appropriately honored for their struggle against Saddam and dealt with more generously than those organized post-Saddam. Regardless of when formal militias were organized, job opportunities must be created for their members and joining the army should be an option for all former younger members and retirement for those who are older who joined pre-collapse militias. Amiri said that many members in the Mahdi Army (formed after Saddam,s fall) were misguided youth who could be brought under control if they had jobs. Militia members who would not join the political process must be dealt with by force.

OTHER ARMED GROUPS

¶17. (C) Amiri stressed that any plan to deal with militias must also address other armed groups operating in Iraq. Amiri said he considered Facility Protective Service (FPS) forces to be ministry-controlled militias. Amiri said that these forces, which he estimated to number as many as 150,000, should be taken out of ministry control and placed under either the MOD or MOI.

¶18. (C) Private security companies or contractors are another serious problem. Amiri said that there are over 80 major companies operating in Iraqi and that they must be

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registered, placed under some kind of control, and limited in the types of weapons they can carry and areas of movement.

¶19. (C) Amiri said that personal security details (PSDs) need to be trained and brought under control. He claimed to have received numerous complaints of abuses by PSD teams, to include PSD teams posing as intelligence or MOI/MOD to conduct kidnappings.

¶10. (C) COMMENT: Given his position as Chairman of the CoR,s Security and Defense Committee and the Badr Corps Secretary General, Amiri,s views are influential with CoR members and moderate Shia factions. His insistence that pre-Saddam militias must be distinguished from and dealt with more gently than those formed afterward reflects that fact that his Badr Corps falls into the pre-Saddam category. END SUMMARY.
KHALILZAD